基于发包方和承接方双向道德风险的信息系统外包博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Information Systems Outsourcing Based on Double-sided Moral Hazard Problem between Outsourcing Firm and Outsourcing Vendor

作　　者：黄清娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]福州职业技术学院,福州350108

出　　处：《哈尔滨商业大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第5期63-68,共6页Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition

基　　金：福建省社会科学资金资助项目

摘　　要：信息系统外包可视为存在发包方和承接方双向道德风险问题的非合作博弈安排。通过博弈分析发现,外包契约不应对项目固定费用、失败情形补偿订立单独付款条例,而且根据项目成功溢价分配函数,目标系统越为关键核心,承接方从成功溢价中所获收益越高。此外,就参与方的反应函数特征、以及反应函数变动下的纳什均衡结果进行了讨论。Information systems outsourcing arrangements can be treated as a non - cooperative game involving double - sided moral hazard problem between outsourcing firm and outsourcing vendor. Through game analysis, this paper dcmoostrates that outsourcing contracts should not provide sep- arate payment provision for fixed payment and for failure to the outsourcing vendor, and the profit sharing rule of success premium indicates that the more critical and core a target system is to the company then the larger share of the success premium is acquired for the vendor. This paper further discusses the feature of response functions and Nash solutions under the situations that the response functions changed.

关 键 词：信息系统外包 博弈分析 双向道德风险 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F279.23[经济管理—企业管理]