考虑讨价还价和经理能力的有效激励研究  

Research on the Effective Incentive Considering the Bargaining and the Ability of the Manager

作　　者：刘鸿雁[1] 左莹[1] 

机构地区：[1]华北电力大学,河北保定071000

出　　处：《科技和产业》2013年第9期94-97,122,共5页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(13YJA630053)

摘　　要：在委托代理理论中,由于委托人与代理人各自追求自身利益的最大化,且他们之间存在着信息不对称、契约不完备等不确定性因素,委托人应对代理人进行有效的激励和引导,使其充分发挥自身的能力,达到企业业绩最优。本文建立了一个动态的经理激励合同设计模型,假设经理在完成第一期任务后,可以与委托人重新谈判,进而对经理的有效激励问题进行了研究。根据计算和分析得出,经理能否得到满意的固定薪酬对经理人的行为选择和企业的长期业绩有重要的影响。In the principal-agent theory, principal and agent both want to maximize their pursuit of their own interests and the information between them is asymmetry, the contract is not complete and there also are other uncertainties, the principal should give the agent effective response to in spire to give full play of their ability to achieve optimal business performance. This paper establishes a model of dynamic manager incentive contract design, assuming the completion of the first phase of the task manager, the agent can renegotiate with the client, thus study the effective incentive for managers. According to the calculation and analysis, the manager whether can be satisfied with the fixed salary has important implications for the manager＇s behavior choices and long-term performance of enterprises

关 键 词：委托-代理 讨价还价 激励 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]