中小学教师“凡进必考”录用制度的信息经济学分析  

Information Economics Analysis on the Hiring Teacher System with the Enter Must Be Test's Method

作　　者：白正府[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]华中师范大学教育学院,武汉430079 [2]鲁东大学教育科学学院,烟台264025

出　　处：《教师教育论坛》2013年第8期56-59,共4页Teacher Education Forum

摘　　要：随着国家的重视及教师待遇的提高,教师职业的吸引力越来越强,每年都有大批的高校毕业生及社会人士申请,于是教师录用制度也就得到了重视与改善。最近在我国许多地方都出台了"凡进必考"的录用制度,它一方面提高了录用教师的质量,但另一方面也存在着不经济现象。本文利用信息不对称理论和筛选理论对这一现象进行了分析,最后针对信息不对称方面提出了一些建议。With the national emphasis and the treatment increasing, the teacher vocation＇s attraction is stronger than ever. In recent years, a lot of graduates and the elite in society apply for the vocation. So the hiring teacher＇s system is obtained and improved. Now, many local educational administration introduced ＂the enter must be test system＂. Which improve the new teacher＇s quality on one hand, but on the other hand there are non-economic phenomena. Using the theory of asymmetric information and filtration, this paper analyzes the relative questions, and puts forward some proposals on the asymmetrical information.

关 键 词：“凡进必考” 教师录用 信息不对称 

分 类 号：G635.1[文化科学—教育学] D630.3[政治法律—政治学]