论刘易斯的模态实在论——从两种实在论的比较看  

On David Lewis' Modal Realism: From the Comparison of the Two Realism Theories

作　　者：刘张华[1] 

机构地区：[1]盐城师范学院经济法政学院,江苏盐城224051

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（社会科学）》2013年第9期74-78,共5页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology（Social Science）

摘　　要：在关于可能世界的解释理论中,实在论以克里普克为代表的温和实在论和以大卫·刘易斯为代表的(极端)模态实在论为代表。学界普遍接受克里普克的解释,而拒斥刘易斯的模态实在论,并称之为极端实在论。通过对两种理论的比较分析可以发现,两种实在论在本质上并不是截然对立的,而是一致的。他们都认为可能世界来自于我们的直观。在跨界同一问题的回答上,他们都给出了否定的答案。两种理论的根本区别在于他们对可能世界的理解不同。克里普克指出可能世界就是"可能的状态或历史"这种观念,刘易斯在此基础上向前推进了一步,提出了"可能的状态或历史"这种认识的来源。所以,对可能世界的认识程度的不同导致了克里普克与刘易斯在可能世界实在论上的差异。相较于克里普克的理论,刘易斯的模态实在论更进了一步。On the explanatory theories of possible world, there are two theories for realism--Kripke＇ s moderate realism and David Lewis＇ （extreme） modal realism. Most of scholars in logic field accept Kripke＇ theory and refuse Lewis＇ theory, which was called extreme realism. Comparing the two theo- ties, the two theories And they negated the ent comprehension of are accordant. They both agreed the cognition of possible world were intuitive. problem of trans-world identity. The key difference of them are from the differ- possible world. Kripke points that possible world is the idea of ＂possible state or history＂. David Lewis pushed it ahead and pointed out the origin of the idea of ＂possible state or his- tory＂. So the degree of cognition of possible world caused the difference of the two theories. So Lew- is＇ modal realism transcends the moderate realism.

关 键 词：可能世界 温和实在论 模态实在论 跨界同一 对应体 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]