供应链中企业合作的激励机制研究——基于博弈的视角  

Study on Incentive Mechanism in Cooperation of Supply Chain Enterprises: A Game Perspective

作　　者：李鑫[1] 马斌[1] 

机构地区：[1]太原理工大学经济管理学院,山西太原030024

出　　处：《物流技术》2013年第9期264-267,共4页Logistics Technology

摘　　要：运用一个两级供应链模型,研究产品的市场需求量受销售商参与程度影响的情况下,制造商通过改变销售商对研发改进费用的分担比例来激励销售商提高研发改进的参与度,从而提升产品性能,增加产品销量,使双方利润达到最大的问题。从博弈的视角,分析了制造商和销售商在同时行动、先后行动、协同合作三种前提条件下的行为,从而确定供应链系统达到帕累托最优时,双方的费用承担比例和参与度,保证合作双方的利润均达到最大。还用Rubinstein讨价还价法对供应链系统的剩余利润进行了分配,并用数值算例对研究结果进行了验证和分析。In this paper, using a two-echelon supply chain model, we studied how the manufacturer could motivate the distributor to participate more actively into product RD and improvement to improve product performance and thus maximize the profit of the two. From a game perspective, we analyzed the behavior of the manufacturer and the distributor under three different hypotheses and then determined the cost burden and level of participation of the two when the supply chain system reaches Pareto optimization. Then we allotted the residual profit of the system using Rubinstein bargain method and verified the conclusion through a numerical example.

关 键 词：供应链 博弈 合作 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F252