政治关联、所有权性质与高管变更  

Political Connection,Corporate Ownership and CEO Turnover

作　　者：周林洁[1] 邱汛[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国青年政治学院,北京100089 [2]北京大学光华管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《金融研究》2013年第10期194-206,共13页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(批准号:12YJC630116)的资助

摘　　要：本文研究了不同所有权控制的公司高管政治关联对其变更与业绩之间关系的影响差异,并发现:在非国有企业,有政治关联的总经理变更与业绩不存在显著的相关关系,而总经理无政治关联时,其变更与公司业绩负相关;在国有企业,无论总经理有无政治关联,其变更与公司业绩都负相关。这表明:非国有企业高管政治关联能弥补企业所有权层面政治关联的缺失,业绩不是影响有政治关联的高管变更的主要因素;国有企业的所有权性质使之天然有政治关联,高管有无政治关联不会影响"业绩越差,高管越容易被变更"的治理原则。The paper studied how political connection influences the relationship between CEO＇s turnover and performance under different corporate ownership. We found that, in non - state - owned companies, the turn- over of CEOs with political connection shows no significant relationship with performance, yet the turnover of CEOs without political connection is negatively related with performance. In state - owned companies, whether the CEO is politically connected or not, his/her turnover is negatively related with performance. This demon- strated that for non - state - owned companies, the political connection of the CEO can effectively compensate for the absence of political connection due to its ownership. Therefore, performance is not the main reason for the turnover of the CEO who is politically connected. However, state - owned companies are endowed with po- litical connection due to its ownership nature. Thus, whether the CEO is politically connected or not will not af- fect the corporate governance rule that ＂the worse the performance is, the more likely the CEO is to be changed＂.

关 键 词：政治关联 企业所有权 高管变更 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224