金字塔式集团控股、功能异化与价值呈现——来自中国上市公司的实证研究  

On the Pyramid Group Share-holding,Functional Alienation and Value Presentation——An Empirical Research of Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：王蓓[1] 马丽亚[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学公共管理学院,北京100029 [2]河北科技大学唐山分院,河北唐山063000

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2013年第10期98-109,共12页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金(11YJC630198);对外经济贸易大学科研课题(10QD06)

摘　　要：以中国上市公司金字塔式控股集团为样本,通过追溯最终控制人,实证分析隶属于金字塔式控股集团对公司价值的影响。研究发现,隶属于金字塔控股集团的上市公司的公司价值低于独立公司,集团内部市场不仅没有弥补制度的缺失和市场的不完善,反而成为大股东进行非效率资本配置的工具。最终控制人产权性质不同,企业集团内部资本市场功能异化的成因和表现不同。由于民营企业集团在外部融资市场的"歧视性"待遇,地方政府控制的企业集团的经济和社会双重负担,集团内部资本市场的资源非效率配置损害上市公司价值。而央企集团所处融资环境相对宽松,加之投资者支付"大而不能倒"的保险溢价,使得隶属于中央政府控制的企业集团的上市公司价值高于隶属于民营企业集团和地方政府控制企业集团的上市公司价值。In this paper, taking the ＂ pyramidal controlled groups＂ of listed companies as the sample, tracing the final controller, we make an empirical analysis on the effect of pyramidal con- trolled groups on company value. In general, the market value of group companies is lower than that of stand-alone companies, there is no absence of make-up system and market imperfection of internal market. And it also becomes a tool for major share-holders to do non-efficient resource allo- cation. Finally, due to different nature of controller property, there is differences of causes and per- formance of capital market＇s function alienation inside group. Because of the discrimination treat- ment in the external financing market of private enterprise group, the local government control the group, the non-effective resource allocation of internal capital market may damage the value of listed companies. Central enterprises has a fairly loose financing environment, and with insurance premi- um paid by investors, the market value of the listed companies belonging to central government is higher than that of private groups or those controlled by local government.

关 键 词：企业集团 内部市场 最终控制人性质 公司价值 

分 类 号：F272.7[经济管理—企业管理]