外部约束机制监督与盈余管理行为  

External Constraint Mechanism to Supervision and Earnings Management Behavior

作　　者：方传希[1] 陶学伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆交通大学管理学院,重庆400074

出　　处：《重庆交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第5期48-51,共4页Journal of Chongqing Jiaotong University:Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：外部约束机制是影响上市公司盈余管理行为的主要因素之一,对2007—2009年A股上市公司数据进行回归分析,发现上市公司盈余管理行为与分析师跟进人数显著相关,分析师跟进人数越多,越倾向于隐性化的盈余管理行为,获得标准无保留意见的上市公司越倾向于隐蔽性的盈余管理行为,但法律环境对上市公司盈余管理行为影响不显著。External constraint mechanism is one of the main factors that influence the earnings management behavior of listed companies. The financial data of the listed companies from 2007 to 2009 are used to do the empirical analysis. It is found that the listed company earnings management behavior has a significance associated with the number of analyst attention, the more number of analysts＇ attention, more invisible the earnings management behavior is inclined to, the more the listed company tends to its invisible earnings management behavior. However, the legal environment has no significant influence on the listed companies＇ earnings management behavior.

关 键 词：盈余管理 隐性化行为 分析师跟进 法律环境 审计意见 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]