地方政府间横向税收竞争工具的选择研究——兼论地方税体系的完善  

Research on the Selection of Horizontal Tax Competition Tools among Local Governments

作　　者：刘大帅[1] 张丽微[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学财政税务学院,湖北武汉430073

出　　处：《河北经贸大学学报》2013年第6期82-87,共6页Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business

基　　金：中南财经政法大学博士生科研创新项目"中国省级政府税收竞争工具选择研究"(2013B0302)

摘　　要：地方政府间的税收竞争表现为地方政府利用税收工具来争夺资源,不同的激励导向会产生不同的竞争效果。通过省级面板数据分析可以发现,在我国特殊的政治和经济背景下,地方政府间的税收竞争是客观存在的。不同经济发展水平的地区在税收竞争中表现出策略化的差异,并且主要以共享税作为税收竞争的工具,这样虽然可以促进地方经济的数量型增长,但却不利于转变经济发展方式,有碍于缩小地区间差异,容易形成地区间恶性的税收竞争。解决问题的根本在于改革和完善地方税体系,使地区间税收竞争主要围绕地方税展开,形成良性的税收竞争。Tax competition among local governments manifests that local governments fight for resources by tax tools. Different incentive orientation will produce different competitive effects. Through the provincial panel data analysis, we can find that, tax competition among local governments is the objective existence under the background of our special politics and economy. Areas with different economic development levels show differences in strategy in tax competition, and take the share tax as main tax competition tool, which although can promote the quantity increase of local economy, but it is not conducive to the transformation of the economic development mode, and also go against reducing regional disparities and easily to form a vicious tax competition among regions. The key to solve the problem is to reform and perfect the local tax system, which can make the tax competition among local governments launch mainly around the local tax and form the benign tax competition.

关 键 词：地方政府 税收竞争 地方税体系 共享税 公共投资 增值税 营业税 企业所得税 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]