拍卖与谈判理论研究  

Study on the Auction and Negotiation

作　　者：李为冰[1] 张列平[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2000年第11期1566-169,共1页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

摘　　要：研究了在拍卖与谈判之间选择一个可以使出售人收益最大的方式 .结果显示 :在一系列合理假设的前提下 ,通过比较边际收益的期望值发现 ,拍卖比谈判更有利可图 .其政策含义是 :当企业经理被允许出售其公司时 ,因为设计最优拍卖机制所需要的信息是巨大的 ,有些信息甚至无法获得 ,他们不应当将其资源用于收集信息以设计出最优机制 ,而应将其资源用于扩大拍卖市场 .To sell a company, which one is more profitable, an auction with no reserved price or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? This paper shows that under a series reasonable assumptions English auction is often more preferable when bidders' signals are independent and no amount of bargaining power is as valuable to the seller as attracting one extra serious bidder. The analysis also has policy implication for the directors of public company when they are allowed to sell the company. It is often more worthwhile for them to devote the resources to expand the market than to collect information to figure out the best mechanism. The information needed to calculate the best mechanism is substantial and the computation involved are complex, so the results are often not good.

关 键 词：拍卖 谈判 最优拍卖机制 期望收益 边际收益 

分 类 号：F713.359[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32