精敏供应链Stackelberg博弈EOQ决策模型  

Stackelberg game decision model of leagile supply chain upstream period

作　　者：张学龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学商学院,广西桂林541004

出　　处：《计算机工程与应用》2013年第22期11-14,18,共5页Computer Engineering and Applications

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(No.11YJC630290);广西高等学校科研资助项目(No.200103YB050)

摘　　要：在非合作和合作两种不同情景下,不考虑缺货损失条件,研究一个主导方供应商和两个跟从方制造商不同订货成本结构的两层精敏供应链上游段Stackelberg博弈的EOQ决策模型。引入供应商价格折扣策略,通过模型分析与求解,得出Stackelberg博弈下的EOQ决策均衡点,改善了精敏供应链上游段的整体运行效率,提高了供应链参与成员的各自收益。通过实例分析,验证了模型的可行性。Stackelberg game EOQ decision model of leagile supply chain upstream period that is made up a leading party supplier and two follow party manufacturers which are many different cost structures is studied in the non-cooperation and cooperation two different situations without regard to shortage cost. Stackelberg game EOQ decision equilibrium is obtained according to an- alyzing and solving this model, introduced supplier price discount strategy. Leagile supply chain upstream period is improved, and their income is also increased. Finally, case numerical example is confirmed to the feasibility of this mode.

关 键 词：精敏供应链 供应链上游段 STACKELBERG博弈模型 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]