公平关切下闭环供应链定价策略  

Pricing Strategy in the Closed-loop Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns

作　　者：张克勇[1] 侯世旺[2] 周国华[3] 

机构地区：[1]中北大学经济与管理学院,太原030051 [2]中北大学机械工程与自动化学院,太原030051 [3]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2013年第6期841-849,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2011M501272);铁道部科技研究开发计划项目重点课题(2011D010-D);中北大学科学基金资助项目(201156)

摘　　要：将公平关切行为倾向引入到闭环供应链的定价决策中,在零售商公平关切下分别针对制造商考虑和不考虑零售商公平关切性两种不同情形,构建了相应定价决策模型,利用博弈理论对模型进行分析求解。研究表明:零售商的公平关切行为倾向对零售商和制造商的定价决策和利润均具有影响;当零售商具有公平关切时,制造商应该给予考虑而参与博弈,这对制造商自身是有利的。在零售商与制造商都具有公平关切情形下,双方的公平关切行为倾向对双方的定价策略与利润均具有影响,公平关切行为倾向是双方获取闭环供应链系统利润分配的一种有效手段。同时,双方的这种公平关切行为倾向会造成闭环供应链系统效率的损失。We study the price strategy in the closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns, and construct two different price models under two different situations where the manufacturer considers retailer＇s fairness concerns or the manufacturer doesn＇t consider retailer＇s fairness concerns. We analyze the price models with game theory. The results show that the retailer＇s fairness concerns tendencies affect the pricing strategies and profit of both the retailer and manufacturer. The manufacturer makes more benefits when he considers the retailer＇s fairness concerns than that when he doesn＇t. Thus the manufacturer should actively take part in the game. When both parties of supply chain show fairness concerns, the behavior tendencies affect to some degree the pricing strategies and the profits of both the retailer and manufacturer. The study shows that the behavior of fairness concerns is an effective measure for the two parties to share the gains in the supply chain, but the efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain decreases at the same time.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 公平关切 STACKELBERG博弈 定价策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]