民营企业终极控制性股东特征与公司融资决策行为  

Research on the Relation between Characteristics of Ultimate Controller & Corporate Financing Decision

作　　者：朱乃平[1,2] 田立新[2] 陈娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学财经学院,江苏镇江212013 [2]江苏大学理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《预测》2013年第6期22-28,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(51276081);中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2013M541622);江苏省博士后科研资助计划项目(1202036C);江苏大学高级人才基金资助项目(10JDG103)

摘　　要：终极控制性股东不但影响公司表决权和剩余收益索取权的格局,还可能影响着公司的融资决策行为选择。本文以2004～2011年A股民营上市公司1112个观测值实证检验终极控制性股东在表决权、现金流权、公司治理等方面所呈现的特征与公司融资决策行为选择偏好的关系。结果表明我国上市公司终极控制人所拥有的表决权与现金流权两者分离程度越高,其对负债的破产威胁效应和利益转移限制效应越不敏感,越偏向于通过高负债融资等手段以达到获取超控制权收益的目的。The ultimate controlling shareholders not only affect the distribution pattern of control right and residual claim, but also enormously affect the behavior choice of the corporate financial decisions. This paper, with a firm-level dataset 1112 observations of private listed companies from 2004 -2011 based on ultimate shareholder＇s views, empirically examines the relationship between the characteristics of ultimate shareholder＇s controlling rights, cash flow rights and corporate governance and the preference of corporate financial decisions. The findings are as follows： the ultimate controlling shareholders are not sensitive to the bankrupt threat effect when the separation between control right and cash flow right reaches a high level. And in the meantime they prefer to infringe the interests of the other shareholder by high debt financing in order to seize the super control gains.

关 键 词：融资模式 行为选择偏好 利益侵占 超控制权收益 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]