对我国股东派生诉讼的反思:保持激励与制约机制的平衡  

Reflection on Shareholder Derivative Suit of our Country:Keep Balance between the Incentive and Restraint Mechanism

作　　者：陈群峰[1] 

机构地区：[1]中央民族大学法学院,北京100081

出　　处：《河北法学》2013年第11期64-69,共6页Hebei Law Science

摘　　要：无论英美法系国家还是大陆法系国家,派生诉讼都成了中小股东寻求救济的经典途径。我国2005年的《公司法》第152条也确立了股东派生诉讼制度,但建立的只是股东派生诉讼制度的雏形,仍存在许多需要完善的问题。因此通过对股东派生诉讼制度追本溯源,梳理该制度产生和发展的理论依据,探寻我国股东派生诉讼应如何保持激励与制约机制的平衡,以实现维护股东利益衡平和股权平等保护的目标。No matter in Common law countries or in continental law countries, the derivative suit has become a classic way in which the small and medium shareholders to seek relief. China also established in 2005 the shareholder derivative suit system in Article 25 of Company Law. However, there are still many problems needed to be improved for the Company Law of China only established the prototype of the shareholder derivative suit system. So, by the means of tracing the origin of the shareholder derivative suit system, rational analysis of the procedure of shareholder derivative suit and combing the theoretical basis of the emergence and development of the system, balanced Incentive and restraint mechanism of shareholder derivative litigation of our country, in order to realize the balance of the shareholder＇s interests and equal protection of share.

关 键 词：股东派生诉讼 公司自治 激励机制 制约机制 

分 类 号：D922.29[政治法律—经济法学]