社会医疗保险基金委托代管的激励机制  

Incentive mechanism of insurance company running social medical insurance fund

作　　者：路云[1] 邓玉林[2] 吴应宇[3] 花磊[3] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学公共卫生学院,南京210096 [2]河海大学商学院,南京210098 [3]东南大学经济管理学院,南京210096

出　　处：《东南大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第6期1330-1334,共5页Journal of Southeast University：Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103033);江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(12GLC005)

摘　　要：研究了政府在医疗保险基金代管过程中对商业保险公司的激励机制.基于仿真计算讨论委托人产出函数为非线性时委托代理模型中的激励措施.结果表明,当外部风险低于阈值时,委托人应采用浮动收益法进行激励;当外部风险高于阈值时,委托人应采用固定收益和浮动收益相结合的方式进行激励.代理人的努力程度与其内部成本系数成反比;代理人所能忍受的外部风险阈值与其风险规避度成负相关关系.因此,委托人应当选择管理经验丰富、人员流动性低、资产规模大和财务状况稳健的商业保险公司进行基金代理,以保证在相同的激励成本条件下能够获得最大产出收益.The incentive mechanism of an insurance company running a social medical insurance fund is discussed.By using the simulation method,incentives in a principal-agent model with a non-linear principal production function are presented.Results show that variable compensation is pre-ferred when the risk is below the threshold;otherwise,combining fixed compensation with variable compensation is recommended.The relationship between the agents effort and the intrinsic cost co-efficient is inverse.The external risk threshold agent endured is negative correlation to the risk aver-sion.Therefore,the principal should choose the insurance company which has rich management expe-rience,low staff mobility,large assets and a stable financial situation to obtain the maximum benefits.

关 键 词：社会医疗保险基金 年度最佳结余率 激励机制 

分 类 号：C979[经济管理—劳动经济]