管理层权利、过度投资与公司价值——基于集权与分权理论的分析  

Managerial Power,Over-investment and Corporate Value:The Analysis Based on the Theory of Centralization and Decentralization

作　　者：李彬[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《财经论丛》2013年第6期75-82,共8页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71102095);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目;西安交通大学"新教师科研支持计划"资助项目

摘　　要：基于集权与分权理论,采用主成分分析方法测度管理层权利,运用个体随机效应模型、固定效应模型和极大似然随机效应模型等回归分析方法,探讨管理层权利、过度投资与公司价值的关系,研究发现管理层权利与过度投资呈现U型曲线关系,过度投资降低了公司价值;在U型右侧曲线上,管理层权利对过度投资与公司价值之间的负向关系具有正向调节效应,在U型左侧曲线上,管理层权利的调节效应并不明显。Based on the theory of centralization and decentralization, using principal component analysis method to measure managerial power, and three regression analysis methods which includes GLS random-effects model, Fixed-effects model and Maximum-likelihood Random-effects model, this paper analyzes the relationships between managerial power, over-investment and corporate value. The empirical results reveal that there is U-curve relationship between managerial power and over- investment; over-investment induces corporate value, and managerial power has a positive moderating effect on the negative relationship between the over-investment and corporate value in the right side of the U-shaped curve. However, the moderating effect of managerial power is not significant in the left side of the U-shaped curve.

关 键 词：管理层权利 过度投资 公司价值 集权与分权 

分 类 号：F275.1[经济管理—企业管理]