企业内部资本配置效率问题研究——基于融资歧视和内部人控制的一般均衡视角  

A Study on Efficiency of Firm's Internal Capital Allocations——A General Equilibrium Approach Based on Financial Discrimination and Insider Control

作　　者：钱雪松[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学经济学院,430074

出　　处：《会计研究》2013年第10期43-50,96,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71003035);中央高校基本科研业务费(HUST:2010AW024)的资助

摘　　要：本文构造了涵括企业内外部资本市场的均衡资本配置模型,引入融资歧视、内部人控制等因素考察了企业内部资本配置的效率含义。研究发现,新兴转轨背景下企业内部资本配置的效率含义十分复杂。政策含义是,从短期看,要针对不同类型企业实施差异性内部资本市场构建策略;从长期看,既要进一步完善公司治理以缓解内部人控制问题,又要致力于消除融资歧视,以加强并优化外部资本市场的资本配置功能。The paper develops a model of capital allocations which include both internal capital markets and external capital markets.We introduce such factors as financial discrimination and insider control and consider the efficiency implications of firm's internal capital allocations from the perspective of general equilibrium.In the short run,different firms should have different strategies of constructing internal capital markets.In the long run,on one hand,we should reinforce the corporate governance in order to alleviate insider control problem,on the other hand,we should try to get rid of financial discrimination in order to reinforce the capital allocation function of external capital markets.

关 键 词：内部资本配置 融资歧视 内部人控制 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]