基于服务正外部性特征的双渠道供应链决策研究  

Dual Channel Supply-Chain Decision under Service with Positive Externalities

作　　者：施涛[1] 许建雷[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆邮电大学经济管理学院,重庆400065

出　　处：《商业研究》2013年第12期184-190,共7页Commercial Research

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目;项目编号:11YJA630071;重庆市人文社会科学重点研究基地项目;项目编号:2010skjd01

摘　　要：供应商引入网络直销渠道可以解决双重边际问题,但可能因零售商的服务外部性而导致服务提供不足。本文使用主从博弈模型对供应商采用不同模式引入网络直销渠道的效果研究表明,市场对零售商服务需求弹性是供应商如何引入网络直销模式的关键,当服务需求弹性超过临界点时,供应商的最优策略是不引入网络直销,或者是主动决定直销价格并将价格定得高于传统零售价;当服务需求弹性小时,供应商应主动降低直销价格以有效降低零售商价格。通过数值模拟对不同协调模式下的服务水平和利润进行比较,验证了相关结论。Introduction of internet direct selling channel can help supplier solve the problem of double marginalization, but it may induce the retailer to supply less service with positive externalities. Through a Stackelberg game model, we get research results ： market elasticity of service demand on retailers is the key how to introduce internet direct selling mode. When the elasticity of service demand is higher than a critical number, supplier＇s optimal strategy is to actively decide the direct selling price and maintain the retailer＇s optimal price, which is higher than the traditional retail price; when the elasticity is lower, supplier should decide a lower direct selling price to effectively reduce the retailer＇s price. Finally, we verify conclusions by comparing service levels and profits in different coordination modes with numerical simulation.

关 键 词：网络直销渠道 服务正外部性 服务需求弹性 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]