风险投资过程中投资者对风险投资家的激励机制研究  

Study on Incentive Mechanism of Investors to Venture Capitalist during Venture Capital

作　　者：赵昕[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2013年第5期88-92,共5页Industrial Engineering and Management

摘　　要：建立了投资者和风险投资家之间委托代理关系的激励机制模型,并针对传统激励机制所存在的不足,提出了额外收益激励和奖励提成激励的优化方法,并进行了仿真验证。结果表明,这些优化方法能够提高投资者收益,且在一定条件下,额外收益激励机制的激励效果更为显著。The paper constructs the incentive model of the agency relationship between investors and venture capitalist,and raises the optimization method of additional incentive and percentage incentive according to the lack of traditional incentive mechanism,and conducts the simulation as well.The result shows that the optimization method improves investor returns,and the effect of additional incentive mechanism will be more significant under certain conditions.

关 键 词：风险投资 激励机制 投资者 风险投资家 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学] C93[经济管理—管理学]