在线拍卖中托投标的监管博弈模型研究  

Supervision game of shill bidding in online auctions

作　　者：吕绪华[1] 陈莉莉[1] 邹明田 

机构地区：[1]武汉科技大学理学院,湖北武汉430065

出　　处：《武汉科技大学学报》2013年第6期465-468,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Science and Technology

摘　　要：针对在线拍卖中卖方实施托投标拍卖出现的欺诈行为,在考虑成本因素的条件下采用非合作博弈理论和方法建立了托投标监管博弈模型,并定量分析监管部门与拍卖方之间互相依存下的决策以及混合纳什均衡问题。通过该模型对拍卖网站监管方和拍卖方决策行为的研究,得出网站监管部门对卖者托投标的最优罚款系数解析式。In light of the shill bidding fraud by the seller in online auctions, this paper builds a supervi- sion game model for the shill bidding on the basis of non-cooperation game theory and method with the cost factors considered. It analyzes the possible strategies and the mixed Nash equilibrium when the supervision department and sellers are interdependent. With the research into the strategies by the regulatory authorities and the sellers, it has obtained the optimal penalty factor analytic formula that can be used as a guidance by the regulatory authorities in their punishment of the sellers who have cheated by shill bidding.

关 键 词：在线拍卖 托投标 监督博弈 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F270.5[经济管理—企业管理]