基于信息不对称的中小企业融资性担保分析  

Analysis of Financing Guarantee for SMEs Based on Information Asymmetry

作　　者：陈海烽[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建江夏学院会计学院,福建福州350108

出　　处：《常州工学院学报》2013年第5期60-65,共6页Journal of Changzhou Institute of Technology

摘　　要：文章基于福州2家融资性担保公司已担保客户作为对象进行归纳分析,将被担保企业分成六类中小企业,比较这六类被担保企业的融资性担保成本,验证信息不对称对中小企业融资性担保的影响,得到了融资性担保市场存在信息不完全对称及逆向选择的结论,并提出了加强关联企业融资性担保监管、融资性担保公司设立增加专业化限制、基于完善的融资性担保评价体系配给担保贷款杠杆的建议。With customers covered by two Fuzhou guarantee companies as the research object,this paper classifies them into six categories of SMEs,and then compare these SMEs in terms of financing guarantee costs in order to verify the influence on SME＇s financing guarantee by information asymmetry. It is revealed that on the financing guarantee market there exist incompletely asymmetry of information and adverse selection. And it is then proposed to strengthen regulation on related enterprises financing guarantee,set up and increase specialized constraints on financing guarantee companies,and improve financing guarantee evaluation system.

关 键 词：信息不对称 中小企业 融资性担保 逆向选择 

分 类 号：F276.3[经济管理—企业管理]