管理者薪酬激励、套期保值与企业价值——基于制造业上市公司的经验数据  

Managerial Salary Incentives,Hedging and Enterprise Value:Empirical Evidences from Listed Manufacturing Companies

作　　者：张瑞君[1] 程玲莎[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872

出　　处：《当代财经》2013年第12期117-128,共12页Contemporary Finance and Economics

基　　金：浙江省哲学社科规划项目(12JCGL12YB);宁波市软科学项目(2013A10020)

摘　　要：基于制造业上市公司的套期保值数据,实证研究了管理者薪酬激励对上市公司套期保值行为及其经济后果的影响。研究发现,如果薪酬激励使得管理者与股东之间的利益越接近,管理者会更大程度地使用衍生金融工具降低摩擦成本和规避市场风险,套期保值越有利于增加企业价值;反之,管理者使用衍生金融工具的目的更可能是规避个人薪酬风险,套期保值越可能降低企业价值。研究结果表明,有效的激励机制是恰当地使用衍生金融工具进行套期保值的重要条件。Based on the hedging data of listed manufacturing companies, this study conducts an empirical analysis of the impact of managerial compensation incentives on hedging behaviors of the listed companies and its economic consequences.The study finds that if salary incentives can narrow the interests between managers and shareholders, the managers would employ the derivative financial instruments to a greater degree to reduce the frictional costs and to erade market risks, then hedging is more beneficial for enterprises to increase their values. Otherwise, derivative financial instruments are more likely to be used by managers to avoid their own salary risks, and hedging is more likely to reduce the enterprise value. The study results suggest that effective incentive mechanism is an im- portant condition to hedge with properly-used derivative financial instruments.

关 键 词：衍生金融工具 薪酬业绩敏感度 套期保值 企业价值 

分 类 号：F234.3[经济管理—会计学]