所有权性质与高管薪酬业绩粘性  

The Ownership Nature and the Pay-performance Stickiness of Senior Executives

作　　者：孙丽[1] 杨丽萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学金融与统计学院/国际金融与风险管理研究中心,上海200241

出　　处：《华东师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2013年第6期123-131,153,共9页Journal of East China Normal University（Humanities and Social Sciences）

摘　　要：上市公司高管薪酬具有较为隐秘的粘性特征,即业绩上升时薪酬的增加幅度显著高于业绩下降时薪酬的减少幅度。运用统计回归的方法,通过对沪深A股市场共计2 475家上市公司的数据进行分析,比较不同所有制上市公司的薪酬业绩粘性特征后发现,所有制对高管薪酬业绩粘性有着显著影响,国有上市公司高管薪酬业绩粘性特征显著强于民营上市公司。上述结论对国企高管绩效考核制度的进一步优化,避免"奖优不惩劣"有着一定的实证参考意义。The executive compensation of listed companies is characterized by secret stickiness,that is, the increase of salaries accompanied with the growth of operating performance is significantly higher than the decrease of salaries caused by the dropping of companies' performance. This paper uses statistical regression method to analyze the data of 2475 companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market. By com- paring the pay-performance stickiness of listed companies with different forms of ownership,this paper demon- strates that the pay-performance stickiness of state-owned companies is significantly stronger than that of pri- vate-owned companies. This study offers reference for further optimization for executives' performance ap- praisal system in state-owned companies.

关 键 词：所有权性质 薪酬业绩敏感性 薪酬业绩粘性 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F272.91