“关系”对民营上市公司代理成本与代理效率的影响  

The Influence of Guanxi on Agency Cost and Agency Efficiency of Private Listed Companies

作　　者：刘晓霞[1,2] 饶育蕾[1] 周蓉蓉[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083 [2]湖南工业大学财经学院,湖南株洲412008

出　　处：《系统工程》2013年第11期40-47,共8页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071166);湖南省哲学社会科学基金资助项目(12YBA103);湖南省自科项目(14JJ7065;14JJ7066);湖南工业大学基金资助项目(2012HSX26);湖南省教育厅青年项目(12B031)

摘　　要：以2007－2009年A股民营上市公司为样本，按所有者与经营者来源关系统计了民营上市公司的关系治理模式，并实证分析了“关系”对代理成本和代理效率的影响。结果发现随着实际控制人与总经理的关系亲密度递减，代理成本和代理效率都递增。亲人总经理能有效降低代理成本，外人总经理的代理效率最高，而统计发现熟人总经理的聘用比例最高。实证研究还表明，民营上市企业的公司治理机制没有能够改变“关系”的治理作用，在股权较集中的情况下，随着公司规模的扩大，聘用外部职业经理人是最优的选择。This paper uses the data from private listed companies during the period between 2007 and 2009 in A shares, and statistics the relationship management modes according to guanxi between owners and operators of these Corporations, and then empirically analyzes the influence of guanxi on agency costs and agency efficiency in different governance modes. The results show that with the decrease of guanxi between actual controllers and the general managers, agency cost and agency efficiency increment. Employing relative managers can effectively reduce agency cost, hiring outsider managers can get the highest agency efficiency, though we find the highest proportion of acquaintance managers among all statistics. The empirical study also shows that, the governance mechanism of private listed companies is not able to change the governance role of guanxi, and that hiring outsider managers is the best choice with the expansion of the corporate scale under the cases of more concentration of equity.

关 键 词：关系 代理成本 代理效率 公司治理 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]