机构投资者串谋对IPO价格的影响  

The Influence on the IPO Price from the Collusion of Institutional Investors

作　　者：刘善存[1] 林千惠[1] 宋殿宇[1] 高雅琴[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京航空航天大学经理管理学院,北京100191 [2]天津大学博士后流动站,天津300072

出　　处：《管理评论》2013年第12期15-24,共10页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71071010;71101004)

摘　　要：研究了机构投资者串谋对首次公开发行价格的影响,通过对中国IPO市场中两阶段询价制度的分析,构建了存在信息更新情况下机构投资者的报价策略模型以及发行方的最优定价策略模型。理论分析表明:机构投资者的串谋行为会影响IPO价格;配售比例、市场信息质量、参与申购人数、机构投资者的风险厌恶程度以及私人信息质量等因素亦会影响IPO价格,从而给出了机构投资者存在串谋情况下首次公开发行成败的条件。最后,通过数值算例进一步分析了上述结果。This paper studies the effect of institutional investors＇ collusion on the Initial Public Offerings （IPO） pricing. Through analy- sis of the two stages inquiry mechanism in China＇ s IPO market with information updating, we construct the models of institutional inves- tors＇ bidding strategy and issuer＇s optimal pricing strategy. This paper shows that the collusion institutional investors can influence the IPO pricing and also shows that there are other elements influencing the IPO pricing, such as placement ratio, quality of market and pri- vate information, the number and risk aversion of institutional investors and so on. Then the conditions of the IPO success with institu- tional investors＇ collusion are given by this paper. Finally, we test the results by comparing static analysis.

关 键 词：机构投资者 IPO抑价 串谋 串谋比例 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F832.51