中央企业公司治理结构设计研究  

Research on Corporate Governance of Central Enterprises

作　　者：王寿君[1] 齐中英[1] 曹利战[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工业大学管理学院,哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《管理评论》2013年第12期69-76,111,共9页Management Review

摘　　要：中央企业规模巨大且科层较多,如何构建一个有效率的治理结构成为向现代企业制度改革的关键。本文首先用一个比较静态分析模型检验了中央企业实行分权制衡的公司制的必要性。然后,对于国资委和监事会委托-代理关系中存在的双重委托-代理链条进行了整合,变外派监事会为内部监事会,破解了现行治理结构中董事会和经理层"合谋"的问题。进一步,我们通过一个含有监督和惩罚的委托-代理模型检验了新治理结构比旧治理结构更加有效,这为中央企业出资人实现最大化收益提供了一个可行的治理方案。Central enterprises are with large scale and multiple hierarchies. Therefore, the key issue of modern enterprise institutional re- form is to build up an efficient governance structure applicable to central enterprises. The paper firstly verifies the necessity of implemen- ting the ＂check and balance＂ corporation system in central enterprises by a comparative static analysis model. Then, the paper integrates the dual principal-agent relationship existed in the principal-agent relations between State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission （SASAC） and Board of Supervisors ; the external board of supervisors is changed into internal one. As a result, the so called ＂conspiracy＂ issue between board of directors and managers in the current governance structure can be resolved. Furthermore, the paper verifies that the new governance structure is more efficient than the old structure by the principal-agent model consisting of supervision and punishment. This provides a feasible governance solution for central enterprise＇ s investors to achieve maximum profit.

关 键 词：中央企业 治理结构 委托一代理 分权制衡 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]