融资约束、代理成本与现金股利政策信息含量  

Financing Constraints,Agent Cost and Information Content of Cash Dividend Policy

作　　者：钟勇[1,2] 陆贤伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031 [2]成都理工大学商学院,成都610059

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第12期140-144,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11XGL001);国家自然科学基金项目(71271174)

摘　　要：利用中国证券市场现金股利公告数据,考察代理成本和融资约束双重制约下现金股利政策的市场反应。实证研究结果表明:相比于融资约束样本和低代理成本样本的现金股利公告,非融资约束样本和高代理成本样本的现金股利公告对市场的负向冲击更弱;在融资约束与代理成本的相互组合不同样本中,现金股利政策公告在同时存在高代理成本和非融资约束时对市场的冲击最小,对市场冲击最为强烈的为同时存在低代理成本和融资约束时进行现金股利的发放。This paper, based on the cash dividend announcement of China securities market, investigates the announcement effect of cash dividend policy under agency costs and financing constraints. The result shows that, compared to the firms which facing more financing constraint and lower agency costs, the negative announcement effect of cash dividend is smaller when the firms that facing less financing constraint and higher agency cost . The impact of the cash dividend policy announcements on the share prices is smallest when the firms facing both high agency cost and financing constraints impact, the negative announcement effect is strongest when the firms facing both lower the agency cost and financing constraints .

关 键 词：现金股利 融资约束 代理成本 公告效应 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]