经理人薪酬辩护与开发支出会计政策隐性选择  

Executives' Compensation Justification and the Implicit Choice of Accounting Policy of Development Cost

作　　者：谢德仁[1] 姜博[1] 刘永涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《财经研究》2014年第1期125-134,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172010)

摘　　要：文章利用我国上市公司2007-2011年数据研究了公司经理人薪酬辩护和开发支出会计政策隐性选择之间的关联。结果发现,当公司经理人当期薪酬辩护需求相对更大时(如公司当期业绩相对较差、当期薪酬相对较高或两者同时具备),公司更倾向于选择开发支出资本化的会计政策。文章的发现表明,公司会利用开发支出会计政策的隐性选择进行盈余管理,且其目的之一就是进行当期的薪酬辩护或提升未来薪酬辩护空间。Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2007 to 2011, this paper investigates the relationship between executives~ compensation justification and the implicit choice of accounting policy of development costs. It shows that with executives＇ greater demand for current compensation justification, namely under relatively poor current corporate performance, relatively higher current com- pensation or both, the companies tend to choose accounting policy based on the capitalization of devel- opment costs. The conclusion suggests that the companies employ the implicit choice of accounting pol- icy of development costs to conduct earnings management for the purpose of justification for current compensation or greater compensation space in the future.

关 键 词：薪酬辩护 开发支出 资本化 隐性选择 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]