股权激励与公司绩效:基于调整成本  

Equity Incentives and Corporate Performance: Based on Adjustment Cost

作　　者：李璇[1] 陶亚民[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200030

出　　处：《经济数学》2013年第4期55-61,共7页Journal of Quantitative Economics

摘　　要：文章从调整成本角度出发,运用广义矩估计法重新审视股权激励与公司绩效之间的关系,并寻找调整成本的决定因素.在不考虑调整成本的传统模型下,公司绩效对于股权激励有显著的负向影响,但考虑调整成本后影响不再显著;在决定因素方面,股权激励的调整速度与机构投资者持股比例、高管数量以及市场价格正相关,公司绩效的调整速度与沉没成本正相关而与公司定价能力负相关.This paper examined the relationship between equity incentives and corporate performance under the presence of adjustment costs and then explored the determinants of adjustment costs. Under the traditional model without adjustment costs, corporate performance has negative effect on equity incentives. However, after considering adjustment costs, this effect disappears. In addition, many control variables which could explain the two variables turn to be insignificant. We also find that corporate performance and equity incentives can be explained by their respective lagged variables. As for factors affecting ad justment speed, the adjustment speed for equity incentives is quicker in firms with more insiders, more proportion of institu tional equity holders and higher market price; the adjustment speed for corporate performance is quicker with higher sunk costs and lower pricing power.

关 键 词：股权激励 公司绩效 调整成本 广义矩估计法 两阶段最小二乘法 

分 类 号：F270.7[经济管理—企业管理]