股权集中下的大股东侵占和债务融资的关系研究评述  

Review on Relationship between Big Shareholder's Expropriation and Debt Financing under Concentrated Ownership Structure

作　　者：杨大楷[1] 王鹏[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第6期97-103,共7页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71273166);上海市哲学社会科学规划项目(2013BJB003);上海财经大学研究生创新基金资助项目(CXJJ--2013--412)

摘　　要：股权集中下大股东侵占及其对债务融资活动的影响是公司金融领域的最新研究热点。在介绍了股权集中现象及实现方式以后,考察了债务融资中大股东的代理风险及衡量方法,综述了大股东代理风险对于债务融资规模、期限结构和融资成本的影响。最后,展望了该领域未来的研究方向,尤其是如何结合中国特殊的制度背景展开相关研究。Big shareholder＇s expropriation and its influence on debt financing under concentrated ownership are the latest re- search trend in the field of corporate finance. This paper first introduces the phenomenon of concentrated ownership and the way of achieving it, then inspects the agency risk of big shareholder in debt financing and its measurement, summarizes the influence of big shareholder＇s agency risk upon the scale, term structure and cost of debt financing. Finally, an outlook is made to the fu- ture research in the field, focusing on how to do research combining China＇s special system.

关 键 词：股权集中 大股东侵占 债务融资 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]