政治关联与内部控制质量的债务契约有用性——来自民营企业的经验证据  

Political Connection and the Usefulness of Internal Control Quality in Loan Contracts: Empirical Evidences from Private Listed Firms

作　　者：洪峰[1] 戴文涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]北方工业大学经济管理学院,北京100041 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《广东商学院学报》2013年第6期42-52,共11页Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12BGL032);北京高等学校青年英才计划项目

摘　　要：内部控制披露为银行的信贷决策提供了新信息源，但企业政治关联对内部控制质量的债务契约有用性产生了挤出效应。以2009年～2011年度A股民营企业为样本的研究表明：内部控制质量越高，民营企业越容易获得有利的债务契约，包括更多的新增贷款、更低的贷款利率和更长的贷款期限；民营企业的政治关联会弱化内部控制质量的债务契约的有用性，内部控制质量较差的企业和位于市场化程度较低地区的企业表现尤为明显。但民营企业政治关联具有天然的脆弱性和不确定性，大力推进企业内部控制的规范化才是其可持续发展的根本保证。Internal control disclosure provides banks with a new information source for loan decisions, but the political connection of firms diminishes the usefulness of internal control quality in loan contracts. Based on the data of Chinese private listed firms from 2009 to 2011, this paper finds that the higher the internal control quality is, the more likely the firms obtain favorable loan contracts manifested as more new loans, lower loan costs and longer loan maturity. Furthermore, political connections weaken the usefulness of inter- nal quality control in loan contracts. The crowding-out effect of political connections on internal control qual- ity is more significant in firms with lower internal control quality and firms located in the region with a slower process of marketization. However, the political connection of private firms is naturally vulnerable and unstable. Thus, promoting private firms＇ normalization of internal control is the fundamental guarantee for their sustainable development.

关 键 词：政治关联 内部控制质量 债务契约 民营企业 

分 类 号：F276.5[经济管理—企业管理] F279.23[经济管理—国民经济]