博弈视野中的公诉裁量权研究  

The Prosecutor's Discretion in the View of Game Theory

作　　者：崔凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖北经济学院法学院,湖北武汉430205

出　　处：《湖北经济学院学报》2014年第1期123-126,共4页Journal of Hubei University of Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年基金项目(13YJCZH023);湖北经济学院青年基金项目(XJ201105)

摘　　要：公诉机关提出的起诉裁量建议,如不起诉决定,由于较少考虑其他诉讼主体的利益而往往不能被广泛接受。运用经济学的博弈理论来分析不起诉裁量行为中检察官、被害人与犯罪嫌疑人的利益关系,可以准确认识不起诉裁量决定的形成机制和运行规律,也使我们发现设立不起诉听证制度是解决困境的一种较好的对策性制度。It is time for us to enforce the prosecution and enlarge the Prosecutor＇s discretion. But the suggests which are held by the prosecutors often are refused by the others,for they think more about themselves and neglect the others. We are in jam. We can use the game theory to analyze the relationship between the benefit of the prosecutor,victim and suspect. And we can true meet the mode of shape and rule of function about prosecutor＇s discretion. It also makes us know the hearing of non-prosecution is a good way to solve the problem.

关 键 词：博弈 起诉裁量 信息 

分 类 号：D915[政治法律—诉讼法学]