上市公司董事会治理与并购绩效关系的实证研究  

Research on Board of Director Mechanism and Performance of M&A

作　　者：潘颖[1] 王凯[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710069

出　　处：《西北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2014年第1期176-182,共7页Journal of Northwest University：Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(12XLJ005);教育部人文社科基金项目(11YJC790179);陕西省教育厅科学研究项目(12JK0033)

摘　　要：并购作为企业外源性监管手段,其作用的发挥离不开董事会机制这一公司治理核心要素。通过对董事会治理机制与并购绩效关系进行系统梳理,以实施并购的上市公司为样本,对二者之间的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:董事会规模与并购绩效无显著相关性;董事长、总经理两职分离的董事会结构有助于并购绩效的改善;独立董事在董事会成员中所占比例越高,并购绩效越好。Board of director mechanism as governance core elements has significant impact on M＆A perform- ance. Based on the relation analysis of board of director mechanism and M＆A performance, taking the Chi- nese listed companies implementing M＆A from 2004 to 2008 as samples, the authors research the effect of M＆A. The research finds that scale of director board has no obvious effect on the performance of M＆A, at the same time, the separation of chairman and CEO is helpful to the firm＇s acquisition performance, the higher the proportion of independent director, the better performance of M＆A.

关 键 词：董事会规模 董事会领导结构 独立董事比例 并购绩效 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]