基于演化博弈理论的流域生态补偿研究——以太湖流域为例  

Research on Basin Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game Theory——Taking Taihu Basin as a Case

作　　者：李昌峰[1] 张娈英[1] 赵广川[1] 莫李娟[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学经济学院,江苏南京210023 [2]太湖流域管理局水文水资源监测局,江苏无锡214024

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2014年第1期171-176,共6页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：江苏省社科基金项目"江苏生态补偿核算体系研究"(编号:10EYB013);国家自然科学基金项目"基于MFA和GIS的区域可持续发展评价和预警"(编号:70873057);江苏高校优势学科建设工程资助项目(PAPD)

摘　　要：进入21世纪以来,在中国经济快速发展的同时,生态环境也进一步恶化,转变经济增长方式、保护生态环境、实行环境污染问责制势在必行,生态补偿作为生态环境治理的有效手段被广泛关注。流域水资源的整体性及资源外部性等特征要求上下游要共同承担生态环境保护,如何建立合理的上下游之间生态补偿标准模型,成为流域管理中急需解决的问题。本文以流域生态治理为研究对象,通过上下游地方政府博弈情景设定,建立演化博弈理论模型,说明在地方政府自主选择过程中对于社会最优的环境保护(保护—补偿)策略不会达到稳定均衡状态,必须引入上级监督部门约束因子,才能确定出最优环保(保护—补偿)策略状态稳定时的惩罚金范围。基于设定模型,以太湖流域为例,建立非参数回归计量模型,通过局部线性回归的方法,计算出超标每吨化学含氧量(COD)的惩罚金额至少为1.95万元,说明在现有的1.50万元的惩罚金额下最优保护—补偿策略是非稳态均衡策略,对于流域生态环境治理具有较强的实际应用价值。After the 21st century, with the rapid development of China＇ s economy, the ecological environment is in the further deterioration. It is necessary to change the mode of economic growth, protect the ecological environment and find out who should be held responsible for environmental pollution. So the ecological compensation has been widely concerned as an effective means of ecological environment governance. The integrity and externality of water resource of basin require protecting the ecological environment cooperatively between upstream area and downstream area. How to establish the reasonable ecological compensation model of upstream and downstream has become an imperative issue to resolve in watershed management. This paper takes the basin ecological governance as the research object and establishes the evolutionary game theory model by setting the local governmental game scene of upstream and downstream. The optimal protection-compensation strategy can＇ t arrive as a long-term stable equilibrium through the local government＇ s independent choice. The government at a higher level should exercise supervision over the local government to ensure the ecological compensation＇ s effective application. It must introduce the higher level government＇ s restraint mechanism, so the scope of the penalty in the steady equilibrium state of optimal protection-compensation strategy can be acquired. Based on above model, the paper establishes the non-parametric econometric model by local linear regression. The result shows that the optimal protection-compensation strategy can reach a long-term stable equilibrium when the penalty is at least 19.5 thousands RMB for per ton of COD overweight, but not 15 thousands RMB of the current. This paper has the strong practical application value for the basin ecological environment governance.

关 键 词：流域生态补偿 演化博弈模型 太湖流域 非参数回归模型 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]