高管政府背景、会计信息与银行债务契约结构——基于我国上市公司面板数据的实证检验  

Managers' Political Connection, Accounting Information and Bank Debt Contract Structure——Empirical Evidence from Panel Data of China's Listed Companies

作　　者：张亮亮[1] 李强[1] 黄国良[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2014年第2期113-124,共12页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BGL028);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(2011009511003)

摘　　要：以我2004-2012年的A股上市公司数据为样本，实证检验了高管政府背景对会计信息债务契约结构有用性的影响。研究结果表明，我国上市公司会计信息债务契约结构具有有用性，但高管政府背景，尤其是地方政府背景削弱了会计信息债务契约结构的有用性，并且这一效应在政府干预较强的地区更加显著。进一步的研究显示，利用高管政府背景获得更长的债务期限结构，反而降低了公司价值。经验证据表明，高管政府背景导致了会计信息债务契约结构有用性的降低，其根源在于政府干预影响了银行信贷决策，而非政府隐性担保的结果。We empirically examine the impact of political connection on the usefulness of accounting information to debt maturity. The result shows that accounting information of listed firms is useful to debt maturity. However, the relation between accounting infor- mation and debt maturity is weakened by political connection, especially the local political connection. This effect is more significant in regions with severe governmental intervention. We also find that longer debt maturity through political connection decreases firms＇ value. The lower usefulness of accounting information to debt maturity resulting from political connection originates from governmental intervention on credit decisions of banks, rather than government implicit guarantees.

关 键 词：高管政府背景 政府干预 会计信息 债务期限结构 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]