产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性的博弈分析  

作　　者：张忠德[1] 陈婷[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安邮电大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《企业经济》2014年第1期48-51,共4页Enterprise Economy

基　　金：陕西省软科学研究计划项目"陕西省战略新兴产业技术创新战略联盟模式与机制研究"(批准号:2012KRM07)

摘　　要：产业技术创新联盟是实现资源互补、攻克关键核心技术、实现共赢的有效技术创新合作组织。联盟能否达到组建目标和完成目标任务,联盟稳定与否至关重要。本文通过联盟稳定性的一次性静态博弈、动态博弈、重复博弈、演化博弈、合作博弈分析,得出了只有长期合作、建立信任关系、有合作成功的示范且比例较高、合作得益分配合理才能维持联盟稳定的相应结论,并从建立长远合作关系、选择合理的利益分配机制、完善相关机制等方面给出了促进技术创新战略联盟稳定运行的建议。Industrial technology innovation alliance is an effective technology innovation cooperation organization which realizes the complementary resources, overcomes the key core technology, and realizes the win - win. Alliance stability is very important for the alliance to achieve the construction goal and the target task. Through one - time static game, dynamic game, repeated game, evolutionary game and cooperative game analyses on the alliance stability, it concludes that the stable alliance can be maintained with long- term cooperation, trust, successful cooperation demonstration, and reasonable cooperation profit dis- tribution. Finally, it puts forward some proposals to promote the stable operation of the technology innovation alliance from the aspects of establishing long - term cooperative relations, choosing reasonable interest distribution mechanism, and improving the related mechanisms.

关 键 词：产业技术创新 战略联盟 稳定性 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]