盈余管理与债务成本——来自中国A股上市公司的实证研究  

Earnings Management and Debt Cost

作　　者：谢获宝[1] 刘波罗[2] 罗子昱[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院 [2]中国地质大学(武汉)经济管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2013年第12期38-42,共5页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金"银行债务契约;财务报告质量与公司投资效率"(项目编号:71072103);国家社科基金项目"我国国有企业高管薪酬管理制度改革研究"(项目编号:10BGL067);教育部人文社科规划基金项目"国有控股上市公司管理层关联方持股的隧道效应研究"(项目编号:10YJA790236)的资助

摘　　要：本文以2003年至2009年我国A股上市公司为样本,分析了盈余管理与企业债务成本之间的关系。结果发现,企业盈余管理程度越高,债务成本越低。国有企业的盈余管理程度越高,债务成本越低,但民营企业的盈余管理对债务成本没有显著影响;盈余管理程度与债务成本之间的负向关系主要存在于制度环境相对较好的地区,在制度环境相对较差的地区并不存在类似结论。说明我国银行信贷管理制度和薪酬考核体系使银行缺乏识别债务人企业盈余管理的动机,相反甚至为其提供了主动寻求规则漏洞的动机。This paper studies whether Chinese banking can identify earnings management behavior of the debtor enterprise by examining the relationship between earnings management and debt cost,using a sample of China's A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2009.The result shows that the higher level of corporate earnings management,the lower the cost of debt.We find that the result is applicable to the state-owned enterprises,while for private enterprise,earnings management does not significantly affect the debt cost.Moreover,the negative relationship between earnings management and debt cost exists mainly in regions with more developed institutions,while it doesn't work in regions with poorer institutional environment.The above findings reflect that,owning to the system deficiency of credit management and performance appraisal,the banking lack the ability to identify the debtor's motivation of earnings management,however it gives the debtor an opportunity to seek for the loop in rules.

关 键 词：盈余管理 债务成本 信贷管理制度 薪酬考核体系 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]