公平偏好、供应商主导和双边努力行为分析  

Research on the Bilateral Effort of Supply Chains of Supplier Dominating in the Inspective of Fairness Preferences

作　　者：浦徐进 朱秋鹰 曹文彬 

机构地区：[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122

出　　处：《预测》2014年第1期56-60,共5页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371086);教育部新世纪优秀人才计划资助项目(NCET-10-0458)

摘　　要：本文构建了一个由供应商主导的二层供应链,供应商和零售商的双边努力行为决定产品最终的需求,尝试将公平偏好引入供应商的决策函数,研究公平偏好对双边努力行为的影响。研究结论表明:供应商和零售商二者的努力水平具有互补的特点;供应商的公平偏好与其努力水平间存在着正相关关系,而与零售商的努力水平间存在着负相关关系;供应商的公平偏好与供应链整体效用之间存在着正相关关系,供应链整体效用将随着供应商同情系数的增大而提高;当供应商的同情系数超过确定的临界值,供应链整体效用将高于不考虑供应商公平偏好时的情形。This paper focuses on a two-echelon supply chain dominated by supplier in which bilateral efforts of the players determine the product demand. We incorporate the concept of fairness into supplier’ s decision function and investigate how fairness may affect bilateral efforts. We demonstrate that efforts made by supplier and retailer are comple-mentary to each other. And positive correlation between fairness level and supplier’ s efforts is found while for retailer, the situation is opposite. Furthermore, the supply chain will experience a rise in the whole utility when supplier ’ s fairness level increases. We also find when supplier’ s fairness level exceeds a certain threshold value, the whole utility of the supply chain is higher than that of the supply chain without considering supplier’ s fairness.

关 键 词：供应商主导 公平偏好 双边努力 效用 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]