不对称信息的供应链激励机制研究  

Asymmetric Information of the Supply Chain Incentive Mechanism Research

作　　者：陈莎莎[1] 谢铁军[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学数理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2014年第1期82-85,173,共5页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(11101028)

摘　　要：研究由单个制造商和单个零售商组成二级供应链,基于市场需求是线性的,且受价格与销售努力的影响。首先,研究在对称信息下,集中模式和分散模式两种情况下的供应链,求出制造商和零售商使得利润达到最优时的最优批发价及销售价;其次,研究了在信息不对称情况下,制造商的机制设计问题,得到了制造商激励批发价的表达式以及零售商的最优零售价的公式;最后利用实例仿真对模型进行分析,结果表明该激励机制对整个供应链的收益有改善作用。It is to study consists of a single manufacturer and single retailer supply chain,based on market demand is linear,and is subject to the influence of price and sales efforts.First study under the symmetric information,respectively from a centralized model and dispersion model in both cases,and the manufacturers and retailers to achieve the optimal profit when the optimal wholesale price and sale price;Secondly,studied manufacturers of mechanism design problem under the asymmetric information,obtained the manufacturer incentives as well as the retailer＆#39;s optimal wholesale price of expression formula of the retail price;and Finally using the instance simulation conclusion that the incentive mechanism could improve the benefit of the whole supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 不对称信息 激励机制 委托代理 

分 类 号：F74[经济管理—国际贸易]