平台竞争与独家交易  

Platform Competition and Exclusive Dealing

作　　者：高洁[1] 蒋传海[1] 王宇[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433 [2]内蒙古大学经济管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特010021

出　　处：《财经研究》2014年第2期67-74,132,共9页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71172139);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0560);上海市"曙光计划"项目(09SG33);上海财经大学研究生创新基金项目(CXJJ-2011-374)资助

摘　　要：文章通过将消费者划分为广告偏好厌恶和广告偏好无差异两种类型,研究了平台与供应商签订独家交易合同排斥竞争对手的问题。研究发现,无论两类消费者的占比如何,平台和供应商都有激励签订独家交易合同;而广告偏好厌恶的消费者占比越高,消费者进入任一平台支付的就越多;独家交易对社会福利水平的影响是不确定的,但是当所有的消费者都是广告偏好厌恶时,独家交易会提高社会福利,当所有的消费者都是广告偏好无差异时,只有独家交易对消费带来的效用溢价足够大,社会福利才会增加,否则,社会福利会减小。By separating consumers into two groups,namely ad-haters and ad-neutrals,this paper studies the exclusion of competitors by exclusive dealing contracts signed by the platform and suppliers.It comes to the results as follows:firstly,the platform and suppliers have incentive to sign exclusive dealing contracts no matter what the proportion of ad-haters to ad-neutrals is;secondly,more ad-haters lead to more payment in any platform;finally,the social welfare effect of exclusive dealing is ambiguous;however,if all consumers are ad-haters,exclusive dealing will increase social welfare,and if all consumers are ad-neutrals,the social welfare will increase only when the utility premium of exclusive dealing is sufficiently large,otherwise, the social welfare will decrease.

关 键 词：平台竞争 独家交易 反垄断 

分 类 号：F272.3[经济管理—企业管理]