需求与回收确定下闭环供应链的竞争与链内协调研究  

Research on the Competition of Closed-loop Supply Chains and Coordinative Contract Design within Supply Chain under Determinant Functions of Product Demand and Used Product Supply

作　　者：徐兵[1] 杨金梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]南昌大学管理科学与工程系,江西南昌330031

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2014年第2期48-55,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(NSFC70961006);中国博士后基金(20100481186);中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目(2012T50593)

摘　　要：针对两条分别由单生产商和单零售商组成、零售商负责废品回收的闭环供应链,运用博弈论和均衡理论建立了对应两条闭环供应链均为分散式供应链、均为集中式供应链、一条为分散式供应链一条为集中式供应链的带均衡约束的均衡(EPEC)模型、纳什(Nash)均衡模型和带均衡约束的优化(MPEC)模型,并进行了模型求解。对比三种模式表明:集中式控制是供应链竞争下的占优策略。随后,给出了两条供应链竞争下可协调分散式供应链达到集中式供应链效果的批发价加回收补贴契约。最后的数值算例和敏感性分析表明了模型的合理性、协调契约的有效性、以及相关参数的影响。Considering two closed-loop supply chains consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer respec- tively, where the retailers recover used products, three models such as EPEC （Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constrains） model, Nash equilibrium model and MPEC （Mathematical Programs with Equilib- rium Constrains） model are set up together with their solving processes by using the game theory and equi- librium analysis method, which respectively correspond to three situations that two closed-loop SCs are de- centralized SCs or centralized SCs or one decentralized SC and one centralized SC. The comparison of three models shows that the centralized control mode is a dominative strategy under SC competition. Then a wholesale price plus recovery subsidy contract is put forward to coordinate decentralized SC obtaining cen- tralized SC under SC competition. Finally, a numerical example and sensitive analysis is performed, which shows the rationality of models, the validity of the contract mentioned above and the affection of related parameters.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 供应链竞争 供应链协调 博弈论 均衡分析方法 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]