政府补贴下竞争闭环供应链回收再制造决策模型分析  

An Analysis on Decision Model for the Competition Closed-loop Supply Chain Recycling Remanufacturing with Government Subsidies

作　　者：贡文伟[1] 李虎[1] 张蓉[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2014年第3期120-125,共6页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL025);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(10YJA630043);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(2011SJB630007);江苏大学高级专业人才科研启动基金项目(11JDG005)

摘　　要：文章以博弈论为研究方法,基于政府对制造商废品回收进行补贴和不补贴两种情形,分析零售商、第三方废品回收商价格竞争环境下,由制造商、零售商和第三方废品回收商组成的再制造闭环供应链决策前后最优策略的变化。研究结果表明:政府对制造商废品回收进行补贴时,零售商、第三方废品回收商的废品回收量、回收价格、废品出售价格以及制造商、零售商、第三方废品回收商的利润均高于政府不提供补贴时的情形,且政府补贴程度越大,上述值越大。最后通过数值算例和仿真分析验证了模型的正确性。The paper uses game theory as a research method,based on with or without government subsidies for recycling man-ufacturers. It analyzes the changes of the optimal strategies before and after decision-making on remanufactured closed-loop supply chain,which consists of manufacturers,retailers and the third-party scrap recyclers,under the price competition be-tween retailers and the third-party scrap recyclers. The results show that,when the government provides subsidies for recycling manufacturers, the amount of recycling, recycling prices, scrap sales prices of the retailers and the third party scrap recy-clers,and the profits of the manufacturers,retailers and third-party are all higher than the government does not provide subsi-dies to them,and the greater the degree of the government subsidies,the greater the value mentioned above. Finally,the va-lidity of the model is verified by numerical calculations and simulation analyses.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 政府补贴 竞争 回收再制造 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]