国有企业改制、大股东控制与公司债务结构  

SOE Restructuring, Large Shareholder Control and Debt Structure

作　　者：刘慧龙[1] 吴联生[2] 李琦[2] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心 [2]北京大学光华管理学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2013年第4期391-406,共16页China Accounting Review

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金项目(编号,12YJC630116);国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71025003、71202028)的资助

摘　　要：本文研究了因改制上市模式不同所导致的控股股东掏空动机差异和控股股东持股比例及其交互作用对债务结构的影响。研究结果发现，相对于非存续分立公司，存续分立公司有息债务比例较高、债务期限较短，这种关系随着控股股东持股比例的增加而减弱；非存续分立公司控股股东持股比例与有息债务占总债务的比例和债务期限负相关，存续分立公司控股股东持股比例对有息债务占总债务的比例和债务期限没有显著影响。研究结果表明，公司债务结构决策未必是为了解决公司代理问题，也可能是公司代理问题的体现。This paper investigates the effects of state-owned enterprise restructuring type, shareholcling structure, and their interactions on the debt structure. We find that, in- completely restructured companies have more interest-bearing debt and more （less） short- term debt than completely restructured companies, which is more obvious as controlling shareholder＇s ownership percentage is smaller~ controlling shareholder＇s ownership percent- age of completely restructured companies is negatively related with interest-bearing debt ratio and debt maturity; controlling shareholder＇s ownership percentage of completely restructured companies has no significant effects on interest-bearing debt ratio and debt maturity. Our evi- dence shows that companies＇ debt structure behaviors may not be in order to resolve agency problems of the companies, but in order to meet the private interests of controlling shareholders.

关 键 词：国有企业改制 大股东控制 债务结构 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]