高薪能够养廉么?——来自中国国有上市公司的实证证据  

Can High Salary Cause Clean Government： From State-owned Listed Companies Empirical Evidence

作　　者：赵璨[1] 朱锦余[2] 曹伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学管理学院 [2]云南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《中国会计评论》2013年第4期491-512,共22页China Accounting Review

基　　金：国家社科基金“国有企业内部控制与风险预警机制研究”项目(项目编号:10XJY006)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文利用2008--2012年国有上市公司相关数据，将高管腐败根据监管部分发现的可能性分为显性腐败和隐性腐败，本文的实证研究发现：（1）对于显性腐败，在中央国有企业中高薪可以抑制显性腐败，在地方国有企业中高薪不可以抑制显性腐败；进一步研究发现，市场化进程的提高，弱化了高薪对显性腐败的抑制作用在中央国有企业与地方国有企业之间的差异，并且处在高市场化地区的地方国有企业，高薪表现出抑制显性腐败的功效。（2）对于隐性腐败，高薪不能够抑制隐性腐败，并且高管薪酬与隐性腐败具有正相关关系，支持了管理层控制论；进一步研究发现随着市场化进程的提高和管理层权力的降低，高薪表现出了抑制隐性腐败的功效。实证研究结果表明，中国政府解决腐败问题不能盲目照搬新加坡的“高薪养廉”制度，应注重加强建设激励和监督并重的治腐机制。Based on the background of corruption in China, the paper uses a sample of state-owned listed firms from 2008 to 2012 and divided the executive corruption into explicit corruption and implicit corruption according to the possibility of discovery. The paper finds that： （1） For the explicit corruption, high salary suppresses corruption in central state-owned enterprises. Because there is interdependence between the local state-owned enterprises and local governments, the power of supervision of local government is weaker. Therefore it is in- crease the opportunistic behavior of local state-owned enterprises. High salary is unable to suppress explicit corruption in local state-owned enterprises and the negative correlation be- tween them is weaker in local government enterprises than in central state-owned enterprises. Further study finds that with the increase of the market process, the difference between them is weaker and and in areas of high market, high salary suppresses corruption in local state- owned enterprises. （2） For the implicit corruption, high salary is unable to suppress corrup- tion, and a positive relationship exists between them,which supports the management power theory. There are problems of ＂internal control＂ in state-owned companies, therefore the manger has the opportunity to use their control power to obtain monetary gains and non-mo- netary benefits. And also, with the increase of the market process and the reduce of manage- ment power, high salary is able to suppresses implicit corruption. The empirical results show that we can not blindly copy Singapore＇s ＂high salary for clean government＂ system to solve the problem of corruption, we must strengthen supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism to solve the managerial corruption.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 高管腐败 管理层权力 在职消费 国有企业 

分 类 号：D630.9[政治法律—政治学] F832.51[政治法律—中外政治制度]