竞争情报系统质量控制的实施:Nash均衡与甄别  

Quality Control Implementation of CI System: Nash Equilibrium and Screening

作　　者：于海东[1,2,3] 罗云峰[3] 

机构地区：[1]三峡大学电气与新能源学院,湖北宜昌443002 [2]三峡大学图书馆,湖北宜昌443002 [3]华中科技大学自动化学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《广西师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2013年第4期28-32,共5页Journal of Guangxi Normal University:Natural Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101058)

摘　　要：竞争情报系统可以提升利用复杂数据集合获取知识和洞见的能力,为确保其实用性和安全性,有必要对其质量控制的实施进行关注。通过设计合理机制可以帮助企业事前从服务商群体里识别最优服务商,以确保竞争情报系统的质量标准。研究表明:企业对服务商的财务补偿比例可以逆向调控服务商前期对系统的R&D经费投入,以达到企业的期望值。在此基础上,本文构造企业甄别竞标入围服务商能力的博弈模型,为竞争情报系统质量标准的合理制订提供了定量描述依据。Competitive intelligence system enhances the ability of using huge amounts of complex data sets to obtain knowledge and insight,which ensures its practicality and security. Thus it is necessary to pay attention to the quality control of competitive intelligence system. For guaranteing the quality stan- dard of competitive intelligence system,rational mechanism design can help the enterprise to identify the most optimal from the service provider groups in advance. The research shows that financial compensa- tion proportion could regulate R^D spending adversely as much as the enterprise had expected. Further- more,it constructs a game model for the enterprise to screen the ability of shortlisted service providers and provides a quantitative description in formulating reasonable quality standard of competitive intelli- gence system.

关 键 词：竞争情报系统 质量控制 NASH均衡 分离均衡 

分 类 号：TP393[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]