高管行政出身、双重成本与公司业绩——来自国有上市公司的经验证据  

Administrative Background Top Executives,Double Cost And Firm Performance: Empirical Evidence from Listed State-owned Enterprises

作　　者：逯东[1] 余磊[1] 林高[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《财经科学》2014年第3期39-50,共12页Finance & Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"政府控制权;高管政治关联与国企治理研究"(71103147)的资助

摘　　要：本文考察了行政出身的国企高管对公司经营的影响。研究发现,高管的行政出身会给企业带来更为严重的双重成本(即政治成本和代理成本);在控制了双重成本的作用后,行政出身对公司业绩也存在正面影响;但总体而言,行政出身会损害公司业绩。研究结论支持了政治成本和代理成本理论,揭示了"行政出身-双重成本-公司业绩"这样一条影响路径;同时也验证了行政出身所存在的"扶持之手",全面揭示了政府人事控制的作用机制。Using the SOEs listed companies as our samples, this paper explored the impact of administrative background on corporate performance. We find that, firstly the administrative of top executives in SOEs do bring more double cost, i. e. political cost and agency cost; secondly, after controlled the impact of double cost on corporate performance, we find administrative background also have positive effects on corporate performance; but all in all, political connections of top executives in SOEs do harm corporate performance. On the one hand, the empirical evidences in our paper support the political cost and agency cost theory, reveals a impact path of ＂administrative background-double cost-firm performance＂; On the other hand, our evidences also confirm the helping hand effect bring by administrative background do exist, in a more entire way we reveal the impact mechanism how political connections affect corporate performance.

关 键 词：行政出身 政治成本 代理成本 公司业绩 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济] F224