二次订货机会下基于交易信用的供应链组合激励机制  

Combined Incentive Mechanism Based on Trade Credit in a Supply Chain with Reordering Opportunities

作　　者：曾顺秋[1,2] 骆建文[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,长沙410081 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报》2014年第2期277-281,289,共6页Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072063;71001063;71372107);上海市教委科研创新项目(13ZS021)

摘　　要：对广告影响随机需求且带有二次订货机会的两级供应链,比较了集中决策与分散决策系统下供应链成员的最优策略.研究表明:在分散决策供应链中,单一的广告补贴机制难以实现供应链的完美协调;通过设计由交易信用与广告补贴构成的组合激励机制,可以使零售商的订货数量与广告投入同时达到集中决策时的最优水平,实现制造商与零售商期望利润的帕累托改善.通过一个数值算例验证了主要结论,并说明了相关参数调整对供应链最优策略及期望利润分配的影响.Based on a two-level supply chain with reordering opportunities under advertising dependent random demand, this paper compared the supply chain members＇ optimal policies between centralized and decentralized decision-making systems. The comparsion shows that it is very difficult for a single advertising subsidy mechanism to realize perfect coordination of the decentralized supply chain. Therefore, through the combined incentive mechanism which consists of trade credit and advertising subsidy, the manufacturer could induce the retailer to choose the optimal ordering quantity and advertising investment for the centralized system, and further achieve the Pareto improvement of the manufacturer＇s and retailer＇s expected profits. Finally, this paper proposed a numerical example to verify the main conclusions, and to illustrate the effect of adjusting the relevant parameter on optimal policies and the splitting of expected profits of supply chain.

关 键 词：供应链 交易信用 二次订货 广告补贴 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224.3[经济管理—国民经济]