在弱选择及突变Moran过程下的演化博弈策略占优研究  

On study of strategy dominance in evolutionary games under the weak selection and mutation with Moran process

作　　者：沙艳虹[1] 周永辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州师范大学数学与计算机科学学院,贵州贵阳550001

出　　处：《贵州师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第1期40-43,共4页Journal of Guizhou Normal University：Natural Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(11161011)

摘　　要：研究了有限N种群博弈在策略突变、弱选择和Moran过程下的策略占优问题,主要讨论了创新性学习和模仿性学习两种机制下的两策略(A,B)演化博弈结果。我们发现,策略占优与博弈支付矩阵(a b c d)和种群数量相关:在创新性学习模型中,当且仅当1/2(a+b-c-d)N-a+d>0,策略A占优;当N>>0,当且仅当a+b>c+d,策略A冒险占优。在模仿性学习中,当(d-b)/(a-b-c+d)<1/3且N≥6时,A策略占优。Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical tool to study the evolution of strategies. In this paper, we study strategy dominance problems in evolutionary games under the weak selection and mu- tation with Moran process in N finite population. We mainly discuss evolutionary games with two strategies {A,B} We find that the strategy dominance is related to the game payoff matrix and the number N of population ： In creative learning model, the strategy A dominates B if and only if 1/2（a ＋b-c-d）N-a＋d 〉0,and whenN 〉 〉 O,A is adventure dominant if and only ifa ＋ b 〉 c ＋ d. In theimitation learning , strategy A dominates B when d-b/a-b-c＋d〈1/3andN≥6.

关 键 词：演化博弈 弱选择 突变 Moran过程 策略占优 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]