独立董事的独立性影响因素及治理效果研究——基于董事会投票的证据  

The Determinant and Governance Effect of the Independence of Independent Directors: Evidence from Board Voting Behavior

作　　者：刘桂香[1] 王百强[2] 王柏平[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学财政金融学院 [2]北京大学光华管理学院 [3]天津财经大学珠江学院

出　　处：《科学决策》2014年第1期15-26,共12页Scientific Decision Making

摘　　要：论文考察了中国上市公司中独立董事相对于公司管理层独立性的影响因素及独立董事的实际治理效果。采用中国独有的强制披露的独立董事对董事会议案投票的数据进行研究,解决了以往研究中的内生性问题。研究发现,独立董事在绝大多数情况下并不会对董事会议案提出公开质疑,然而当公司业绩较差时,独立董事更有可能质疑公司管理层的行为。进一步研究发现,存在异议独董的公司股票收益率在之后两年内会有更加明显的提升,并且存在异议独董的公司正向盈余管理的水平明显低于无异议独董的公司。这表明当公司经营状况不佳时,独立董事自身的监督作用能够得到充分的发挥和体现,并且其监督行为能够提高公司价值和公司的会计透明度。由此可知独立董事制度的设立确实能够对中国的上市公司产生一定的治理效果,具有较为积极的意义。This paper examines the determinant and govemance effect of the independence of in- dependent directors of Chinese listed companies using the unique mandatory disclosure data of independent directors voting on board motion, which successfully controlled the endogenous problem. The empirical analysis find that, in most cases, the independent directors will not publicly question the motion of the boards~ while when the performance is poor, the independent directors are more likely to question the managers＂ behavior. Further study finds that, the stock return of companies with dissent independent directors will increase significantly in the following two years, and the positive earnings management is much lower than companies without dissent independ- ent directors. The results indicate that, the supervisory role of independent directors is much more efficient when the company is in a poor condition. And this role will increase both the market value and accounting transparence of the company. To sum up, the independent director mechanism in China obviously has a positive govemance effect.

关 键 词：董事会独立性 董事会投票 独立董事 公司价值 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理]