利益博弈、同意一致性与农村宅基地制度演化  

A Study on Interest Game,Agreement Consistency and Evolution of Rural Housing Land System

作　　者：张振勇[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]山东农业大学经济管理学院,山东泰安271018 [2]山东财经大学工商管理学院,济南250014

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第2期18-24,31,共8页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2011GL004);国家社科基金项目(12BSH069)

摘　　要：目前我国宅基地制度与现实不适应性越来越强烈,宅基地的隐性流转也愈演愈烈。通过对农村宅基地制度变革中的利益博弈分析表明,利益集团之间利益博弈推动农村宅基地制度演化,而利益集团之间利益的耦合程度及其力量对比关系决定着制度演化的路径。通过建立进化博弈分析模型,可以探究我国农村宅基地制度演化的机制,寻求宅基地制度演化过程中各利益集团的进化稳定策略,以及进化稳定策略影响因素,实现制度变革"同意一致性",促进农村宅基地资源配置效率的提高。为了实现我国农村宅基地制度向良性轨道演化,必须支持农民弱势利益集团的形成与发展、抑制强势利益集团对公共政策的过度渗透、改变政府角色。At present, Chinas housing land system in rural areas is getting further and further away from adaption to the reality, and the covert transaction of housing land is increasingly intensifying. The research indicates that interest game among interest groups promotes the housing land system evolution, but the degree of matching interest and the correlation of interest forces among interest groups determine the path of the evolution. By establishing a model of evolutionary game theory, we can find the Evolutionary Stable Strategy of interest groups during housing land system evolution, and analyze the factors affecting the Evolutionary Stable Strategy, and achieve the ＂agreement consistency＂ during the change of the system, thus to promote the improvement of the efficiency of resource allocation in housing land. In order to achieve the healthy track of the housing land system evolution, it is necessary to support the formation and development of weak farmers＇ interest group, to suppress excessive penetration of powerful interest groups on public policy, and to change the role of the government.

关 键 词：宅基地 利益博弈 同意一致性 制度演化 

分 类 号：F301.3[经济管理—产业经济]